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Evolving  Entitlements: Intervening to Prevent  a
Collective  Harm
David  S.  Brookshire,  Philip T. Ganderton, and Michael  McKee
When  market transactions  generate  negative  externalities,  the injured  party may  ini-
tiate  court action to prevent  harm or to  obtain compensation.  The political  response,
in some  cases,  has  been to broaden  the set of agents  who  can intervene through the
court, often by admitting  entirely new categories  of potential  intervenors.  We employ
an  experimental market  setting to investigate  the effect  of an increase  in the number
of potential intervenors  (introduced as admitting  an additional class of persons  having
the necessary  standing  in law).  The results  suggest  that there  will be  a  substantial
increase  in the  number  of  actual  interventions.  The increase  means  that  social  re-
sources  expended  on  interventions  will increase  and  there may be  a consequent  re-
duction in  trading  activity in the affected markets.
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Introduction
New  Mexico's water  law  was  recently  amended.  Under  the  1982 and  1985  amendments
to  the  existing  water  law,  groups  or individuals  could  approach  the  state  engineer  (the
arbiter  of  water market  transactions)  under  the  "public  welfare"  clause  to  block  water
transfers  (Dumars  and  Minnis).  Before  these  amendments,  those  directly  affected  by  a
water  transfer  (for example,  a  water  transaction  which  would  lower  the  water  table  and
expose  a  well pump)  could approach  the state engineer  and ask for  consideration.  While
the public  welfare  clause  has  not  been  clearly  defined  in  New  Mexico  and  is  open  to
interpretation  by  the  state  engineer,  it  is  currently  interpreted  as  providing  a  potential
avenue  to  intervene  to  protect  environmental  features  such  as riparian  habitat  or recrea-
tional  use  (Dumars  and  Minnis,  p.  824).  Under  the  public  welfare  clause,  any  group
affected  by  a  water  transfer,  other  than those  who  were  already  entitled  to  approach  the
state engineer,  can now intervene.
These changes  to New Mexico's  water  law offer  an example  of more general  cases in
which market  transactions  generate  negative  externalities,  with no  immediate mechanism
to  facilitate  the  efficient  exchanges  between  traders  and  injured parties.  As  in  the New
Mexico  case,  a number of social and political responses  can emerge including  regulations
constraining  behavior  or a  greater use  of the courts  to pursue  compensation.  In response
to  the claims  of the  injured parties,  the  legislature may  define  a  set of expanded  entitle-
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ments, beyond those  conveyed through direct property interests, to a wider class of agents
affected  by the negative  externality.
Expanded  entitlements  represent  a new  institutional  arrangement  that potentially  alters
the  way  existing  markets  operate.  But who  are  the  agents  that participate  in  allocating
society's  resources  under  these  new  arrangements?  In  the  example  investigated  in  this
article,  a  new  class  of  agents  that  can  intervene  in  a  market  transaction  through  legal
process  is  added to the  existing  class of agents  that have  a  direct property  interest in  the
market. These new agents  did not have an established legal claim before entitlements were
expanded,  whereas  the  existing,  or  original,  agents  have  direct  interest  in  the  property
rights involved in the transactions.
The  use  of court-ordered  injunctions  for  externality  problems  reduces  or  eliminates  a
large part of the transaction costs associated with alternatives such as class actions (Cooter
and Ulen). Under a regime  of expanded  entitlements, organizations  such as the Sierra Club
become  empowered  and  can  sue  to  preserve  environmental  amenities  without  having to
identify  other  potential beneficiaries,  in particular,  beneficiaries  with direct property  inter-
ests.  In  addition,  several  intervenors  may  sue  simultaneously,  because  agents  are distinct
(this  is  not  a  class  action).  Each  intervention  increases  the  probability  of  at  least  one
successful  intervention.  However,  any  successful intervention  confers  a benefit to all who
suffer the externality,  so the outcome is  a pure public good.  Those who  seek to restrict or
prevent the  original  transaction benefit  from successful  intervention,  but the outcome  for
social welfare  is not  necessarily  positive  since the original  transactors  lose potential gains
from trading.
We  investigate  the boundary  between  market  and  collective  decision making  created
by introducing  a new  group of intervenors  to society's decision-making  framework.  Our
investigation  focuses on the impact  of expanding  the set of intervening  agents on market
transactions.  We hypothesize  that the result may  be an increase  in the  level of interven-
tions against  market exchanges  across a broad class  of environmental  goods. This article
presents  an empirical  test of this hypothesis  using  experimentally  generated  data.
Since this institutional change is recent,  especially in the environmental area,  field data
which  would permit  assessing  the  impacts  of enlarging  the  set of potential  intervenors
on the  volume  of interventions  undertaken  are  currently unavailable.  To  investigate  the
effects  of  increasing  the  pool  of potential  intervenors,  an  experimental  market  is  con-
structed  with  the  essential  features  of  the  institutions  just  described.  The  changes  in
individual  and group behavior  are observed  as the institutional  setting evolves toward a
broader  set of entitlements.  In the experimental  market a transaction between two traders
imposes  a negative  externality on others,  each of whom would benefit if this transaction
is  prevented.  Secondary  markets  through  which  agents  can  absorb  the  external  effects
are  unavailable,  the  only  avenue  available  is  legal.  A  single  successful  intervention  is
sufficient  to block  the transaction  and  is a public good.  In the experimental  market two
distinct groups  suffer the externality.  Initially,  only members of one group  can intervene
although the benefits  of successful  intervention  are enjoyed by both groups.  Members of
the  second  group  are subsequently permitted to  intervene.
The  experimental  data  show  that  increasing  the  number  of  potential  intervenors,  by
admitting a new  class of potential intervenors,  increases the number of interventions.  This
increase comes  from the newly empowered individuals  who actively  intervene while those
originally  able  to  intervene  reduce  their  interventions.  Interventions  by the  new  group
more than compensate  for the  reduced  interventions  of the original  group.  From  a policy
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perspective,  the  empirical  results  suggest  that  expanding  entitlements  will  lead  to  more
interventions  to prevent  market  transactions.  Whether  the  interventions  are  successful  or
not,  increasing  their  number raises  the costs for  traders  in these  markets  and  reduces the
volume  of transactions.
Theory  and Hypotheses
To the representative  individual,  the result of intervening,  or "going  to court," is uncertain.1
In deciding to intervene,  an individual must weigh the certain  costs of intervention  against
the expected  gains. The  payoff to the status  quo is normalized  to equal  zero.  A necessary
condition  for  an  individual to  undertake  intervention  to prevent  or  limit an  exchange  is
that the utility of the expected  return from intervention  is positive,  that is,
(1)  E(AUtility  from intervention)  =  U[p(G-C) +  (1-p)(-C)]  > 0,
where p  is the probability  of success  of the  intervention,  G is the gain if successful,  and
C is the cost of intervening.  If there is only one potential intervenor, the above expression
provides  the information  needed  to predict whether an intervention  will occur.
When there  are  multiple potential  intervenors,  the individual payoff is still defined by
(1),  but  the  probability  p  is  no  longer  the  individual's  probability  of  success  but  the
probability  that  any  (at least  one) intervention  is  successful.  Any  one  successful  inter-
vention  is a public  good,  as  all  sufferers of the externality benefit  from the action.  Even
though  the  individual  is  more  likely  to  intervene  because  the  value  of  (1)  is  higher  in
this  case,  the problem  of free  riding makes  an individual's  decision to  intervene  some-
thing that can  only be investigated  empirically.  In the example of the amendments  to the
New Mexico  water law, the amendments  give a new  class of agents the right to approach
the  state  engineer.  Previously,  agents  who  were  directly  affected  by the  water  transfer
could  intervene,  and  any  successful  intervention  would  confer  some  benefit  on  each
affected agent.  Entry of a new class of agents affects every  agent's decision to intervene
since the probability  of at least one successful intervention  is given by a binomial density
and is  a function of the number  of intervenors.
The  public good provision  game being  played by our intervenors  is  functionally  similar
to Palfrey  and Rosenthal's  participation problem in which individuals  must choose whether
or not  to contribute  a  fixed  amount  to provide  a  public  good,  and  the good  will  only  be
supplied  if at  least  a  specified  fraction  of the  group  contribute.  In  the  present  setting  no
explicit threshold  of contributions  is necessary for the public good to be supplied, but there
is a best outcome  for the group:  the equilibrium level of interventions  is defined  as equating
the marginal  payoff to having another participant  (change  in expected  value)  to the cost of
participation.  If the  game  generates  an  interior  solution,  in the  Nash  equilibrium  some in-
dividuals  will be intervenors  while others  will not.  Those who choose  to intervene  will not
wish  to withdraw their intervention  nor will those not intervening  wish to attempt  an inter-
vention. With  the parameters  chosen in our experimental  setting, the  efficient outcome  is an
interior  solution  since  the  probability  of  at  least one  successful  intervention  is strictly  in-
creasing  in the  number of interventions  attempted,  but the marginal  probability  is declining.
We  are  not the  first  to investigate  the  effects  of uncertainty  on  individual  willingness  to  contribute  to public  goods.
Suleiman  and Rapoport,  for example,  have  also investigated  such  settings.  Our work  differs from previous work  in this  area
by  focussing on  the role of intergroup  interactions  and the  effects of institutional  evolution  on individual decisions.
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The participation game yields efficient outcomes in that the number of individuals who
voluntarily  participate  in  the  provision  of the  provpublic  good  is  efficient.  However,  this
prediction  is  contingent  on  the  individual  agents  being  risk  neutral.  With  risk-averse
individuals,  the efficient  outcome depends  on the existence  of a money-back  provision
whereby  those that offer to  contribute  have their contributions  returned in the event  the
collective  good  is not  provided.  Since the  court costs  are  incurred  "up  front,"  there  is
no possibility  of a money-back  provision  in the intervention  setting. That is,  even  if an
inefficient  level  of intervention  occurs,  the  individuals  cannot have  their  court fees  re-
turned. Furthermore,  the  outcome  is  stochastic  so  the  failure to  obtain  a  successful  in-
tervention  does  not necessarily  imply  that  too  few persons  undertook  to  intervene.  In
this  setting, risk-averse  agents will underprovide  the public good.  Applyin  the  partici-
pation game results  to the current  problem yields the  following  testable  hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: When the  members  of the original  group of potental  i  intervenrs are
the only ones permitted  to intervene,  the level of interventions  will be less than the
participation  game equilibrium.
Individual  rationality  implies that  the  newly  recognized  individuals  will  intervene  if
their expected gain  exceeds  the cost; that is, they will behave  in the same fashion  as the
original  group  of potential  intervenors.  But  the  new  agents  are  not  the  same  as  the
original  class  of potential  intervenors.  For the new individuals,  the costs  of intervening
exceed  expected  gains, but their interventions  increase the  probability  of success-they
can  contribute  to the provision  of the  public good. Motives  are difficult  to observe,  but
regardless  of the actual  motivation,  the testable hypothesis  is as  follows:
Hypothesis 2: When a new class is permitted to intervene, the members do intervene
and the  effect is an  increase in the total  number of interventions  undertaken.
In the Nash  equilibrium,  the  interventions  undertaken  by those in  the new class  will
lead the original class  members to reduce their level of intervention. However, when the
probability  of success  for  the members  of the new  group  is  lower,  more  interventions
must be undertaken  to maintain the previous  probability  of at least one  success.
Experimental Design
The  experiments  reported  here  are  designed  to  investigate  the  responses  in  individual
behavior  when  the  institutional  setting  changes.  The experimental  market  captures  the
essential  features of the institutional  evolution  and the  affected  markets.2 In the instruc-
2 The critical precepts of the experimental  method as set out in (Smith) are nonsatiation,  salience, dominance, privacy, and
parallelism.  Nonsatiation in the reward  medium used in the experimental  market  is necessary  for the subjects  to base  their
decisions  on the relative size of the payoffs.  Salience of the rewards is necessary  to motivate the subjects to incur the decision
costs required  to make  good decisions in the experimental market.  Dominance of the monetary  payoffs  is necessary  for the
experimenter  to  maintain  control  over  the  decision-making  environment.  That  is,  the experimental  payoffs  must  dominate
"any  subjective  costs  or  values  associated  with  participation  in the  activities  of an experiment"  (p.  934).  To  strengthen
dominance  it may be necessary  to establish  privacy  such  that the  subjects  are given information  only  on their own payoff
alternatives.  Thus,  the issue  of fairness may be avoided  when these  are not germane to  the experimental setting.  Parallelism
refers to the  condition  that  the decision  environment  in the  experimental market  mimic,  as  much  as  possible,  the essential
features of the naturally occurring  setting.
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Table  1.  Experimental Design:  Number of Agents
No. of  No.  of
Class A  Class  B
Sessions  Agents  Pr(Success)  Agents  Pr(Success)
S1  5  0.5
S2  5  0.5
S2.1  5  0.5
S3  5  0.5  5  0.1
S3.1  5  0.5  4  0.1
S3.2  5  0.5  5  0.1
S4  5  0.5  9  0.3
S4.1  5  0.5  10  0.3
S4.2  5  0.5  10  0.3
Note:  An experiment  session indicates  an independent  running of the
design.
tions given to subjects,  they are told that a trade of some  good  (tokens) is about to take
place  between  two agents  (these  agents  are not  actually  participating  in the  experiment
and  are  not  present  in  the  laboratory)  and  that  this  exchange  will  impose  a  loss  on
themselves  and others.3 They know what this individual loss will be and they are offered
the right  to  intervene to  obtain an injunctive  remedy.  Subjects  may  choose to intervene
without knowing the  choices taken  or outcomes  realized  by the other  subjects.  Success
from intervening  is uncertain.  The probability  that  each individual intervention  will be
successful is announced  in advance, but the group's success probability is not announced,
nor is it known  by the subjects  or the experimenter  in  advance.
There are two distinct classes of potential  intervenors  in the experimental  setting. The
first  class is  referred  to  as  "Class  A,"  these  are  the  persons  deemed  to  have  a  direct
property  interest  in  the  marketplace  transaction.  For  example,  these  agents  may  draw
water from the same system in which some transaction  is about to take place. The second
class of potential  intervenors  is referred  to as  "Class  B,"  these  are deemed  to have  no
direct  property  interest.  For  example,  these  agents  may  derive  employment from recre-
ation  on  water  courses  in  the  system  or  may  want  to  protect  an  endangered  riparian
habitat  on  a river affected  by the proposed transaction.  Members  of Class  A historically
suffer  more  of the  negative  impacts  of the  proposed  exchange.  They  are presumed  to
have  a higher standing in court which  is reflected  in a higher probability  of a  successful
intervention.  In New  Mexico, a  state where diversion defines the beneficial use of water,
an agent diverting water downstream from a proposed transaction will have higher stand-
ing than  an agent  claiming  losses  due  to insufficient instream  flows.  Members  of Class
B  do  not  have  a  direct  property  interest  in  the transfer.  They  are presumed  to  have  a
lower standing  in  court  than Class  A agents  which  translates  as  a  lower  probability  of
success  in  intervening.  As  the  experiment  begins,  the  potential  intervenors  consist  of
only  Class A  agents.  Later,  the  sequence  of institutional  settings  evolves by expanding
the group  of potential  intervenors  to  include  agents  of Class B.
The  experimental  design  is  presented  in  tables  1  and  2.  The  subjects  participate  in
3 The  traders  are  simulated  in  the  experimental  markets  since  the  behavior  being  investigated  is  that  of the  potential
intervenors.  Complete  experimental  instructions  are available  from the  authors.
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Table 2.  Experimental Design:  Structure of Sessions
Rounds  S1  S2  S2.1  S3  S3.1  S3.2  S4  S4.1  S4.2
.---.....................  (number of rounds  each treatment)  .........................
A-Private  6  6  4  5  4  3  4  3  3
A-Public  5  5  5  -
A-Public  5  5  4  5  4  4
(B agents  present)
AB-Public  4  4  5  5  5
Note:  Rounds  are  described  by  the type  of  agent  able  to  intervene  (A  or B)  and  the  nature  of  the
intervention  (a private or a public  good).
only one  session. Each  session consists of rounds, over which  institutional  settings  may
change. The sequence of institutional settings corresponds  to the stages of the institutional
evolution  as  new groups  are  given intervention  rights.  Subjects  are  informed that  each
new institution  will be  in  place for an  unknown  number  of rounds.  All  sessions begin
with rounds  in which  the  intervention  is a  private  good  (A-Private  rounds)  in  order to
demonstrate  to  subjects  the  role  of market  trades,  the  nature  of  an  intervention,  and
mechanism  of intervening.  Following  this  are rounds  in which  intervention  is  a  public
good  (A-Public and AB-Public  rounds in the tables). Of the nine sessions that constitute
this experiment, three (S1,  S2, and S2.1) have only Class A agents. The other six sessions
have  both  classes  of agents  in  the laboratory.  As the public  good  rounds  progress,  the
institution evolves to allow the Class B  agents to intervene (the AB-Public rounds). Thus,
each  session  is  made  up  of  a  series  of rounds  that  evolve  through  three  institutional
settings.  The number  of rounds  in  each  session  and  how many rounds  are allocated  to
each  institutional  setting  are  given  in  table  2.  This  design  enables  us  to  examine  how
subject behavior changes  as  the number  and type of potential intervenors  is increased.
The  decision  parameters  differ between the classes of agents in the experiment.  Class
B  agents  have a lower  cost of intervening  as well as  a lower probability  of success. The
lower cost  of intervening  represents  a lower technical requirement  to  intervene  (for in-
stance,  in the water example  this would  arise because  this class of intervenor  would not
have  to undertake hydrological  surveys).  The lower probability  of success represents  the
agents'  lower standing  in  law.  All information  is common  knowledge  in these  experi-
ments.  That is,  the losses,  the cost of an  intervention  attempt,  and  the individual  prob-
ability of success  are known to  all agents.  Each  class of agent is informed of the other's
parameters  and told that  this  is common  knowledge.  Since the  subjects  decide whether
to  intervene  without  knowing  the  decisions  of the  others,  they  are  playing  a  game  of
complete but imperfect  information  (as  specified in Palfrey  and Rosenthal).
In all  sessions  there are five Class A agents.  The parameters  in sessions S3,  S3.1,  and
S3.2  are  constructed  to  simulate  a  "strict"  version  of the  court's  behavior  in  granting
potential  intervenors  standing  in law.  Only  four or five Class  B  agents are admitted  and
their probability  of success on intervention  is  set at a  fairly low 0.1.  Sessions S4,  S4.1,
and  S4.2  represent  a  more  "lenient"  version  of the court's  behavior.  Here  nine  or ten
Class B  agents are  admitted  and  their probability  of success  is  set at 0.3. 4
4 These experiments  are  designed to investigate  a  specific  policy  change rather than  to test  a theoretical  proposition.  For
this reason,  the experimental  design  deliberately  does  not address  a situation in which  there are a small  number of Class B
agents with  a low probability  of success  (and vice  versa).  A  liberal stance  toward the new  class  (B)  on  the part of the court
would imply  high probability  of success  and a large  set of agents.
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A round of the experiment  begins  as  the  subject is  told, through an  information  slip,
of the number of tokens  (experimental currency)  the traders  intend to exchange  and the
loss the  subject  will suffer if the exchange  is not prevented.  If intervention  is  allowed,
the  subject  indicates  whether  he  or she  wishes  to  intervene,  without  knowing  whether
any  other agent has  purchased an intervention  attempt.  Having  chosen to  intervene,  the
subject  is handed  a ten-sided  die to roll.5 One  or more successful  interventions  prevents
the exchange.  The  subject's earnings  after each  round  are calculated  as  follows:
Earnings = Endowment - I(Cost of Intervention) - (1-S)(Loss),
where I =  1 if agent intervened,  and S  = 1 if any intervention  was  successful.  A record
sheet allows  each  subject to keep track of each round's  actions  and earnings  throughout
the session.
These  are  hand-run experiments  and all  subjects  are recruited from principles  of eco-
nomics  classes.6 Participation  is  voluntary  and  subjects  earn  money,  not  extra  course
credits. The subjects have no prior experience in the laboratory setting being investigated.
The sessions  last between  1.5 and 2 hours and the  subjects earn average  payoffs of $25.
Empirical Evaluation of Intervention Behavior
The  efficient  level  in  the participation  game  is  defined  as  the  number  of interventions
for which  the marginal  gain to the group just exceeds the cost of intervening.  Where the
outcome  of a  successful  intervention  is  a  public  good,  each intervention  increases  the
probability  of at least one  successful  intervention.  Because of this, interventions  will be
undertaken  up to  the point where  the  expected  gain  (to  the  group) just covers  the cost
of intervention.  The game's equilibrium  is economically  efficient.  The equilibrium  num-
ber of interventions  in  a round  is found as  the  solution to:
max(n)  {Prn(success).loss.N >  Cost},
where  the objective  is maximized over integer  values of n,  the Prn  function is the prob-
ability  distribution  function,  loss is measured at the individual level,  as  are Costs and N
is the size  of the group  affected by the public good.  Interventions,  counted by the index
n,  will continue  as  long as the difference between the change  in the expected group gain
(loss  avoided)  and  the  cost  of another  intervention  is positive.  For each  individual  in
each round, the  Cost is fixed,  as  is N; the  loss is known  and  the probability  of success
can be  (theoretically)  calculated  from  available information.  Group  losses,  (loss-N),  are
determined  by the total number in both classes  of agents since benefits from intervention
accrue  to  all  agents,  regardless  of whether they  can intervene  or not.
In the rounds  in which only Class A agents  can intervene,  but intervention  is a public
good  (labeled  rounds  6-10),  each  A agent  has  a probability  of  success  of 0.5  and  the
The  intervention  attempt is  generated  by  rolling a die  and the  outcome is  "success"  or  "failure"  depending  on the roll
of the die. This  is  to simulate  the randomness  associated  with  "going to court"  or intervening  to prevent  a transaction.  The
decision  to purchase  a roll  of the die  and  the outcome of an individual  roll  are private-there  is  no means  for the subjects
to identify  which persons  (if any) purchase the roll of the die.
6 The  student  body  at  UNM  is  more  heterogeneous  than  the  average  student  body,  with  a mean  age  of  27  years,  a  high
proportion  of part-time,  nontraditional, returning,  and older-age  students,  as  well  as  more minorities.  This tends  to reflect more
the heterogeneity  observed  in the  "real  world."  The estimated  behavioral  models  suggest that student  subjects  are responding
systematically  to the experimental  parameters,  which is evidence  against  the idea  that students  are  "just playing  a game."
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Table 3.  Marginal Group Success  Probabilities for





Can  Class A  Class  B
Intervenor  Intervene  Intervenes  Intervenes
1  0.500  0.500  0.500
2  0.250  0.250  0.250
3  0.125  0.125  0.125
4  0.062  0.062  0.062
5  0.031  0.031  0.031
6  0.003  0.009
7  0.003  0.007
8  0.002  0.004
9  0.002  0.003






Group  size  (N)  5  5,  5  5,  10
Pr(success)  0.5  0.5,  0.1  0.5,  0.3
marginal  probabilities  of  at least  one  successful  intervention,  APrj(success), are  found
from  the  binomial  probability  distribution.  These  marginal  probabilities  are  shown  in
table  3.
When  Class  B  agents  can  also intervene  (rounds  11-15),  the equilibrium  number  of
interventions  includes  both classes  of agents.  The  individual  intervention  strategy  when
the  outcome  is  a  public  good  and  both  agent  classes  can intervene  is  described  in  the
following  example.  Consider the situation  in which  either type of agent  can  be the first
intervenor.  The marginal  success  probability  for the  A agent  is  0.5,  while it  is 0.3  for
the B  agent. From the group's perspective,  an intervention  by the A agent will maximize
the  increase in the probability  of a successful  intervention  and  maximize  the social  sur-
plus.7 If the second  intervenor is of Class  A, the probability  of a  successful intervention
increases  by 0.25  compared  to only 0.15  if the second  intervenor is of Class B.  In order
to  maximize  the increase  in  success  probability  for each  successive  intervenor,  all  five
Class A agents  should precede  any of the Class B  intervenors.  Beyond five,  there are no
more  Class  A  agents,  so  further  interventions  must be  taken  up  by others.  As the  last
two columns in table 3  show, the marginal probability  of success  drops dramatically  after
all the Class  A agents have  intervened.8
7 The surplus  is  defined  as the  difference:  {APr,(success)-loss-N - Cost}.  The surplus  generated  by a Class  A intervenor
is $6.25  - $1.00 =  $5.25. The  surplus  generated by  a Class  B intervenor  (for parameters  in the 5  A, 5  B  rounds) is  $1.88
- $0.50 =  $1.38.
8 The  marginal success  probabilities  are  calculated  as  the change  in the multinomial  probability  of at least  one success,  given
that the previous  interventions  were undertaken  by Class A agents  up to  five interventions  and by  Class  B  agents thereafter.
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Table 4.  Critical Marginal Probability Values  Used  to
Determine  Efficient Number of Interventions
Group  Class A  Class B
Size  Agent Loss  Agent Loss  Critical APrn
5  $2.50  $1.25  0.080
3.00  1.50  0.067
3.50  1.75  0.057
9  2.50  1.25  0.057
3.00  1.50  0.044
3.50  1.75  0.038
10  2.50  1.25  0.053
3.00  1.50  0.044
3.50  1.75  0.038
14  2.50  1.25  0.042
3.00  1.50  0.035
3.50  1.75  0.030
15  2.50  1.25  0.040
3.00  1.50  0.033
3.50  1.75  0.029
Note:  Each  critical  value  is  calculated  by  solving  APr,  =
Cost/(loss.N).
The participation  game equilibrium number of interventions  is determined by the num-
ber of potential intervenors,  the loss to be  avoided (the gain  from a successful interven-
tion),  the  cost  of intervention,  and  the marginal  probability  of successful  intervention.
Values  of the  marginal  probabilities  that equate  the marginal  expected  gain  from inter-
vention  with  the  cost of intervention  are  given for each  experimental  scenario  in  table
4. These critical values, along with the data reported in table  3,  can be used to determine
the  Nash-equilibrium  number of interventions  for each  round.
Table  5  presents  the  equilibrium  and  observed  level  of interventions  in  each  round
and  the  interventions  by  both  classes  of agents,  as  well  as  an indication  of when  the
level  of interventions  is the  participation  game  equilibrium.  To  evaluate  Hypothesis  1
that Class A (those with a direct property interest) participation  will be less than expected
when intervention is a public good, we focus on the intervention behavior in the A-Public
rounds  (six through  10).  There  are  27 such  rounds  over the sessions  3 through  4.2. The
level  of interventions  is  the  predicted  equilibrium  in  eight of these  rounds,  above  the
predicted  equilibrium  in  eight rounds, and  below  the predicted  equilibrium  in the  other
11  rounds.  The frequency of below equilibrium  outcomes is 0.41.  Although the result is
not  strong,  the  data  cannot  reject  Hypothesis  1:  when  the  original  group  of potential
intervenors  are the  only  ones permitted  to  intervene,  the  level  of interventions  will be
less than the participation  game equilibrium.  By way of comparison  with other findings,
Simmons  et al.  and  von de Kragt,  Orbell,  and Dawes  find that  the level of undercontri-
buting  is 0.45  in  the treatments  most  similar to  those reported  here.  There  is evidence,
however,  that  the subjects  are playing  the  participation  game.  In the  earlier sessions  S1
through  S2.1,  there  are  29 relevant  rounds  and in  18  of these  the  level of intervention
is  below  the  equilibrium  (frequency, f;  is  0.62).  The  overall  payoff  to  intervention  is
higher in sessions  S3 through S4.2, since there  are more agents  present  (Class B  agents
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Table 5.  Actual and Efficient  Interventions of Experimental Sessions  by Round
Round
Interventions  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15
5,5a  5,5  5,5  5,5  5,5  3,3  3,3  3,3  3,3  3,3
0,2  1,0  1,1  4,2  1,1  1,2  1,3  1,1  0,1  2,0
5,5  5,5  5,5  5,5  5,5  3,3  4,4  3,3  3,3  3,3
4,2  4,5  5,4  3,3  4,4  2,3  2,1  3,3  2,4  2,4
5,5  5,5  5,5  5,5
4,5  4,4  4,4  4,4
3,3  4,4  3,3  3,3  3,3
4,3  4,3  2,1  2,5  2,3
5  5  5  5  5  3  4  3  3
3  5  4  5  4  4  3  2  1
0  0  0  0
3  5  4  5  4  4  3  2  1
5  5
2  0
4  5  2  0
5  5  5
5  3  4
5  3  4
5  5
3  3
3  4  3  3
4  4  3  2
0  0  0  0









3  4  3  3
4  2  4  2
0  0  0  0
4  2  4  2
3  4  3  3
2  3  4  3
0  0  0  0
2  3  4  3
3  4  3  3
5  4  4  4
0  0  00
5  4  4  4
3  4  4  3
3  3  1  3
0  0  0  0





4  4  44
1  1  1  3
1  2  2  4
2  3  3  7
4  4  44
3  3  2  3
1  1  1  0
4  4  33
4  4  44  4
3  3  2  3  3
2  1  1  2  0
5  4  35  3
4  4  45  4
1  2  1  0  2
4  5  41  4
5  7  5  1  6
4  44  5  4
4  44  4  4
5  42  4  3
9  8  6  8  7
4  44  5  4
2  3  4  3  2
2  1  2  2  2
4  4  6  5  4
Note:  Numbers in bold indicate that the number of interventions was the participation game equilibrium.
a Double  entries  for Sessions  1, 2, and  2.1  indicate  that there were two A groups  in each round,  acting
separately  in contributing  to  the public  good. Class  Bs are not present  in any of these  sessions.
are included in  the calculation  of total losses).  The subjects  appear  to respond by inter-
vening more.
To  evaluate  Hypothesis  2,  that  a  new  group  of intervenors  will  increase  the  total
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through  15)  when both  classes  of agents  are  allowed  to  intervene.  In  only eight of the
28 rounds  is the total  number of interventions  less than the equilibrium  level (f is 0.29).
Sessions  4  through  4.2  are  particularly  striking  since  in  only  one  of  15  rounds  is  the
number of interventions  below  the predicted  equilibrium.
As  discussed  above,  given  the  parameters  in  the  experiments,  it  is  not efficient  for
Class  B  agents  to  intervene  in  any  round.  Yet  in  26  of the  28  rounds  they  intervene
when  they  can. During  rounds  six  through  10,  in  which  only the  original  class  (A)  can
contribute  to  the public  good,  the  intervention  rate  is efficient  in  15  of  57 rounds  (f  is
0.26).  During  rounds  11  through  15,  when  both  classes  can  intervene,  Class  A  agents
only intervene efficiently  in five of the 28 rounds  (f is 0.18),  and in none of these rounds
is the  total level of intervention  efficient. 9 When  Class B  agents intervene,  the  Class A
agents  respond  by  reducing  their interventions.  Whether  Class  B  agents  are motivated
by altruism  or decreasing  absolute  risk aversion  cannot  be determined  within the exper-
iment.
The evidence  of undercontribution  (and,  hence,  failure to  reject  Hypothesis  1) when
intervention  is  a  public  good  is  strong,  since,  in  over  half the  rounds,  the  number  of
interventions  is less than the efficient  number.  During  the A-Public rounds  (six  through
10),  some Class A agents fail to participate in 30 of the 57 rounds (f = 0.53),  and during
the  AB-Public  rounds  (11  through  15)  this  proportion  rises  to  0.82.  It  must  be  noted
however,  that in only  12 of the 52 rounds  (f = 0.23) when intervention  is a private good
and in the best interests of the individual,  do all individuals intervene-in all other rounds
some individuals  chose not to intervene.  Intervention rates,  relative to the efficient level,
are  lower in  the A-Private  good  rounds than  the  A-Public  good rounds,  but free  riding
is strongest  in the  AB-Public rounds.
A much richer investigation is possible using econometric methods. The simplest spec-
ification  of the model  of actual  interventions  is that  the actual  number  of interventions
is equal  to  the efficient  number,  that  is, I  =  aI* +  E, where  E is  a random  error  term.
The null hypothesis  is  Ho:  a  =  1. The  estimate  of a is  0.699  with  a  standard  error  of
0.030,  hence  the null hypothesis  is rejected  in favor  of an  alternative  of undercontribu-
tion. This simple specification  provides a direct test of Hypothesis  1, but it only explains
11.6%  of the variation in the dependent variable.  A more detailed  "reduced-form"  spec-
ification  that  accounts  for the institutional  features  that change  between  rounds  as  well
as  the heterogeneity  of the potential intervenors  (Class  A  and  B)  should perform  better
in a  statistical  sense.
During  the private  rounds,  the  variables that  determine  the efficient  number  of inter-
ventions  are  the probability  of a  success,  the loss incurred,  and  the cost of intervention.
During the public rounds the number of potential intervenors  becomes  important, as does
the class composition  of the group.  Table 6 reports  the estimated  regression  models that
include  these  variables.  Dummy  variables  are  included  to  indicate  the  public  rounds
(A-Public  and  AB-Public),  as  well  as  an  interaction  term  for  Class  B  agents  in  the
AB-Public  rounds.
Included in the  specification  of the model is a variable  indicating  no successful inter-
ventions  in  the previous  round.  This  variable  is included  as  a  control  for an  aspect  of
the  experiments  that may  be  influential.  Even  though  in  practice  agents  would not un-
9  In  only two of these  rounds  is  the number of Class  A interventions zero  (session 4, round  14  and session  3.1, round 4).
The total  number of interventions falls  short of the equilibrium  number of interventions  in both cases.
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Table 6.  Regression  Models  of Group Intervention Behavior
Model  I  Model  2  Model 3
Variable  (OLS)  (FGLS)  (DVLS)  Mean
Constant  -1.201  -0.225
(-2.86)  (-0.51)
Loss  1.108  0.760  0.220  2.456
(5.47)  (3.46)  (0.86)
Pr(Success)  3.120  3.774  5.500  0.378
(4.07)  (4.60)  (6.19)
Group  size  (N)  0.085  0.064  7.691
(2.85)  (2.25)
Rounds  6-10  -1.501  -1.704  -0.862  0.433
(-4.43)  (-5.46)  (-4.41)
Rounds  11-15  -2.158  -2.194  -1.397  0.289
(-4.73)  (-5.03)  (-5.16)
Class B  in  2.523  2.125  2.051  0.144
rounds  11-15  (6.85)  (5.93)  (5.90)
No  success  -0.325  -0.193  -0.195  0.129
last round  (-1.29)  (-0.81)  (-0.84)
Adj. R2 0.540  0.515  0.610
Log likelihood  -288.7  -278.9  -267.2  -367.6
Note: Dependent  variable is the  number of interventions  per round.  The mean is 2.402.  Figures in paren-
theses  are  t-statistics  for the test  of H,:  8i  =  0.  Sample  size is  194 for  all regressions.  OLS  is  ordinary
least squares;  FGLS is  feasible generalized least squares;  DVLS is  dummy variable  least squares.
dertake  repeated  rounds  of intervening,  in  the  experiments  subjects  intervene  over  a
sequence  of repeated rounds.  Intervention behavior may,  therefore,  be influenced by the
consequences  of previous  behavior.  The  simplest form  of intertemporal  response  would
be that a failure of the group to successfully  intervene may cause more than the efficient
number  of people  to  contribute  to interventions  in  the  following  round.  The estimated
coefficients  in  all models  for this  variable  are not statistically  different  from zero,  pro-
viding  evidence  that  this is  not a  serious  problem in  the experiments,  and that  subjects
are able  to  treat each round  as  an independent  optimization problem.
Three distinct econometric  models  are estimated  and reported in  table 6. Because the
data are  generated  by different  groups of subjects it is possible that heteroskedasticity  is
introduced by group effects  and that the group effects may not be random,  as is assumed
in the ordinary least squares  (OLS) regression  specification.  Two alternative methods for
modeling groupwise  heteroskedasticity  are presented  here. The first is  a feasible  gener-
alized  least squares  (GLS)  estimator,  which is a maximum-likelihood  estimator obtained
using  an iterative  procedure  detailed  in  Greene.  A test  of the  hypothesis  of homoske-
dasticity,  based  on  the estimates  from this  model,  indicates  the presence  of groupwise
heteroskedasticity. 10 The second  method  of testing for and  correcting  heteroskedasticity
is to use methods developed to analyze panel data. Using this strategy, the possible group
effects  can be modeled  as fixed  effects  or random effects.  Treating  each group effect  as
an independent  shift factor realizes the dummy variable  least squares  (DVLS) model.  In
10The test  statistic,  described  in Greene  (p.  396),  is distributed X
2 with  11  degrees  of freedom.  The calculated  value of 29.9 has
a probability  value of 0.002,  hence the  null hypothesis  of homoskedasticity is  rejected in  favor of groupwise heteroskedasticity.
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a random effects specification,  the group effects are treated as if they are drawn randomly
from a distribution  of effects.  A Hausman  test for  the difference between  the fixed-  and
random-effects  models  finds  no  difference,  and  as  a consequence,  only the fixed-effects
model is reported in table  6 (Greene,  p. 479).  The fixed-effects  model has a higher value
for the log-likelihood  function  than both  the  OLS  and  the  GLS  estimators.  The  fixed-
effects  (DVLS)  model  can  be  used  to  test the hypothesis  that  the  group  effects  are  the
same,  as  well  as  testing  for the presence  of group effects  over  a model  specified  with
the exogenous  variables  only.  The hypothesis  test for  no group  effects  is rejected  as  is
the hypothesis that  the group  effects  are  the  same."
Nearly  all  coefficients  have  the same  sign and magnitude  across  the alternative  spec-
ifications reported  in table  6.  In addition,  all variables  are  statistically  significant except
for the  past  round,  lack-of-success  variable  in  all  models  and  the  loss  variable  in  the
fixed-effects  model.  Coefficient  estimates  indicate  that an increase  in the  expected  gain
from intervention  (a function  of the loss and the  probability  of success)  increases inter-
ventions.  Increased group size increases interventions  even though the effect is relatively
small.  Variables  controlling  for private  or  public  rounds  and  for  subject  heterogeneity
are statistically significant and of special interest as these are the  "unknown"  parameters
of the model,  about which we  have  no expectations.
Class A agents lower their intervention rate significantly in the public rounds compared
with the private rounds.  But the efficient  number of interventions  is lower in the public
rounds.  The average  efficient  number  of private  round  interventions  is  five,  during the
A-Public rounds it is 3.2 and during the AB-Public rounds it is 4.1. Efficient interventions
in the A-Public rounds should  be 1.8  lower,  on average,  than for the private rounds.  The
estimated  reduction  in  interventions  during  these rounds  is  1.7  from  the  FGLS  model,
1.5  from  the  OLS  model,  and  0.86  from  the  fixed-effects  model.  It  appears  that  this
variable  is capturing  much  of the  public good effect  of a  successful intervention.  These
estimates,  especially  from  the  fixed-effects  model,  support  the  result  identified  in  the
previous  section that  there  is  a  slight overintervention  in  the public  good  rounds  com-
pared with  the other rounds.
In the AB-Public  rounds,  Class A agents reduce their interventions  by an even greater
amount. This represents  substantial underparticipation because the average efficient num-
ber of interventions  during  these rounds is  4.1,  higher than the A-Public  rounds.  At the
same time,  Class  B  agents  have  a  statistically  significant  participation  rate,  controlling
for the other factors,  of over two interventions  per round.  The efficient  number of Class
B  interventions  given the parameters  of the experiments  is zero.  The hypothesis  that the
coefficient  on the Class  B  dummy variable is zero  is rejected at all conventional  signif-
icance  levels.  Class  B  agents respond  to  the  opportunity  of intervening  by doing  so at
an average rate  of 2.25  interventions  per round when  they should not intervene  at all.12
Interventions  per round  average  4.8,  higher than the  average  efficient  number  of inter-
ventions.  The high level of Class  B interventions is unexpected  and cannot be explained
within the  design of these  experiments.  More research  may reveal  the motives  of Class
B  agents,  perhaps  through  the  use  of postsession  debriefing  questions  or  focus  group
n The  F-test of the  hypothesis that  the group  effects  are zero  obtains  a value of 3.94  and the  test that  all group effects  are  the
same obtains a value  of 2.75.  Both test are  distributed F,,,, 174 with a critical 95%  value of approximately  1.90 (Greene, p. 468).
12 The  average number  of Class B  agent  interventions from table  4 is 2.25.  The coefficient on the  Class B  variable in the
regression model is adjusted for the other  factors  that determine  the efficient number of interventions.
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discussions.  Regardless  of the  motives,  the  entire  group's  surplus would  be maximized
by allowing  only Class  A to  intervene,  rather  than relying  on Class  B  to intervene.
Conclusions
Recent  regulatory  changes  have  expanded  the  potential  number  and  variety  of groups
and  individuals  who  have  some  claim to  standing  in  disputes  over the use  of resources
in our economy.  An example is the recent change to New Mexico's water law that allows
third  parties  to intervene  with the  state  engineer under  the public welfare  clause.  Since
field  data are unavailable,  the  experimental  results  reported here suggest  that extending
the right to intervene to prevent a market transaction to an additional group will increase
the  number of interventions.
The  evolution  of regulation  described  here  has  implications  for emerging  markets  in
environmental  amenities.  Increases  in  the  number  of interventions  will  (however mar-
ginally) decrease  the number of trades in the market,  since traders  will have  to preempt
intervenors,  or incur costs  to  defend the trade  against  the arguments  of the intervenors,
regardless  of whether the interventions  are successful.  The welfare implications  depend
on the  relative weights  given to producing  interests and  preservation interests.
[Received January 1995; final version received March 1996.]
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